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ABSTRACT 
 Although e-mail has proven to be a powerful medium for message and information 
exchange, the protocols currently in use have major security shortfalls. As more and more 
people have turned to e-mail as a means of communication, problems experienced by e-mail 
users have dramatically increased. Phishing, spam, and identity theft are just three of the 
problems people experience because of the insecure nature of current e-mail protocols. 
Furthermore, as the amount of confidential information transmitted over e-mail continues to 
rise, these and other problems will only get worse. Although many attempts have been made 
to patch the issues, none have seen great amounts of success. This is most likely due to a 
combination of the difficultly of implementing these security improvements, the absence of 
single standard for secure e-mail, and the general lack of understanding by most e-mail users. 
Security Integrated Messaging is a new protocol for secure message exchange, designed to 
solve these problems. This system uses several proven technologies, such as X.509 
certificates, symmetric and asymmetric encryption, and digital signatures in order to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication to an e-mail-like system. This system represents 
a first step in revamping the way we communicate online in order to protect our digital 
information. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past few decades our society has seen a massive shift in how and why 
people communicate. The Internet has provided us with tools that now seem indispensable 
parts of daily life but just a few short decades ago would have been unheard of. One of the 
most significant developments in this time has been the gradual shift away from traditional 
paper mail systems in favor of a faster, cheaper, more convenient alternative—e-mail. 
 The advantages of e-mail make it incredibly powerful even for inexperienced 
computer users: messages are delivered almost instantly; attachments can be sent in a digital 
form that can easily be viewed, manipulated, or shared; and software has made it much easier 
to keep track of, organize, and search e-mail than its paper equivalent. These abilities, among 
others, have led to companies, governments, and individuals relying on e-mail for more and 
more important business and personal functions. Common examples of this include banks 
sending account statements via e-mail and online retailers advertising through e-mail such 
that users can easily purchase products right from their inbox.  Additionally, businesses such 
as credit card companies and utility providers are allowing customers to receive an “e-bill” 
through their e-mail instead of a traditional paper bill sent through the postal mail service. 
Unfortunately, e-mail is not well suited for these and many other tasks. Although the 
functionality and convenience is there, as is often the case with newer technologies, security 
is lagging significantly behind.  
 Three basic concepts of information security—confidentiality, integrity, and 
sender/receiver authentication—can be applied to e-mail to demonstrate that it does not live 
up to the expectations of a secure system. With the traditional e-mail system none of these 
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concerns are addressed by default. Although strides have been made to create add-ons and 
modifications to existing technologies and protocols, these seem to have done little to protect 
the average user[1]. This is demonstrated by the fact that confidential information is routinely 
transferred unencrypted[2]; phishing has become a rampant problem costing consumers and 
companies billions of dollars every year[3]; and spam and viruses sent through e-mail are 
also out of control[4, 5]. The unfortunate truth is that even if a company or individual wanted 
to be responsible by providing confidentiality, integrity, and trusted authentication with every 
message sent, currently it is just not possible[6]. 
 As an example of this, imagine a user, Bob, who is concerned with the confidentiality 
of his messages. Bob works at a bank and sends out account statements to many of the bank’s 
clients. In order to be able to encrypt all of these statements, each bank customer would need 
to have a public/private key pair, and the public key would need to be accessible to the bank. 
There are two problems with this scenario.  First, most users do not have a public/private key 
pair, so a campaign would have to be waged by the bank to get them to create such a pair.  
Secondly, even if a majority of the users did have a public/private key, there currently is no 
infrastructure channel readily available for those public keys to be easily or automatically 
distributed.  Therefore, this best scenario solution is currently not possible.  
 Instead Bob wants to at least make sure that his e-mail messages are encrypted in 
transit from his computer to the recipients’ mail server. So he uses an e-mail client that 
allows him to connect to his mail server using an encrypted protocol. He also talks to his 
network administrator and asks her to ensure that the mail server is setup so he can connect 
to it securely. This will help prevent an eavesdropper from intercepting the message while it 
is being transmitted from his computer to the outgoing mail server.  However, after this 
  
3 
transmission has completed, Bob has no control over how his message will be transferred. In 
fact, many mail servers and mail clients do not accommodate, or are not setup to use, 
encrypted protocols. Since Bob’s outgoing mail server will most likely have to retransmit 
each message at least once to the recipients’ incoming mail servers, the security of the 
messages will also depend on the security of the recipients’ mail servers and clients. So even 
if Bob has done his part, and the initial transmission from his mail client to his mail server 
may have been made securely, this is only a small link in a chain of often insecure 
communications. Figure 1 below shows that in standard e-mail, after a message leaves the 
message sender’s computer, it usually must travel through several more servers. In the figure, 
the traffic between the message sender and the first mail server is encrypted, as indicated by 
the lock icon; however, after this link the sender has no control over whether the message 
will be sent using an encrypted protocol.  
 
Figure 1.  Standard E-mail Architecture 
 
 For a second example, imagine Carol who works with an online auction company, 
auctions.com. Periodically auctions.com sends out e-mails to some their users asking them to 
update their personal information, informing them of auctions they may be interested in, or 
telling them about new features that have been added. Unfortunately because auctions.com is 
very popular, many malicious users have sent out e-mails that look very similar to actual 
auctions.com e-mails in order to trick users into giving out their credentials. Carol wants to 
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ensure that the recipients of her e-mails know that they actually came from auctions.com and 
that the message has not been tampered with. This is possible with some mail clients using 
digital signatures. Unfortunately, many mail clients do not know how to interpret these 
signatures, so the users are unable to verify the integrity of the message. An even bigger 
problem is that even though Carol may be a conscientious user who understands the security 
implications of using e-mail, many users do not even realize that it is possible to compromise 
e-mail message integrity or spoof a sender’s identity; nor do they know how to take 
precautions to help prevent this from occurring. Thus most users would not even know to 
look for a digital signature, would not know what a digital signature means, and would 
certainly not be able to tell the difference between a digital signature that verified the identity 
of the sender as opposed to one that only verified that the message had not be changed. 
Figure 2 below shows how a digitally signed message appears in Gmail, a popular Internet e-
mail service. The red boxes have been added to show what is added by including a digital 
signature. Although some e-mail clients can interpret these signatures and give users a clearer 
picture of what they mean, the digital signature in this message clearly would not help most 
users. 
 
Figure 2.  Example of Digitally Signed E-mail 
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 Although the root of e-mail’s security problems seems to be the ease at which a 
malicious user can masquerade as a trusted entity when sending e-mail, the real problem is 
larger than that. Because e-mail is not secure by default, it makes it very difficult to 
implement strong security measures, educate users about them, and bring about widespread 
use of security that would help prevent e-mail’s many problems and safeguard the messages 
that do need security. E-mail was not originally designed to be a secure system, and although 
add-ons and modifications have been created to address these problems, none have caught on 
or become easy enough to setup and use to provide strong security to the masses. It seems 
that until security is automatic and integrated into the system, instead of wrapped around 
insecure data and protocols, secure e-mail may never be widespread. 
 Because of the inherent weaknesses in current e-mail technologies, a new Internet 
messaging standard should be created by focusing on security and ease-of-use in order to 
enable Internet communication for the average user that integrates confidentiality, integrity, 
and two-way trusted authentication. This standard could use many existing technologies, 
such as symmetric encryption, digital signatures, and public key certificates combined in a 
way to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication without need requiring excessive 
setup or maintenance by the user. 
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CHAPTER 2.  RELATED WORK 
 Because e-mail is so widely used and its problems so commonly experienced, many 
previous attempts have been made to make e-mail more secure. This section will describe 
some of the more popular methods currently available to secure e-mail, as well as some more 
recent developments in this area.  
2.1  Current Technologies  
 There are several technologies currently available to users for securing their e-mail 
messages. These methods rely on the standard insecure e-mail protocols, but add a wrapper 
of security around the data in order to protect confidentiality or integrity.  
2.1.1  OpenPGP 
 OpenPGP is a standard that can be used to encrypt and digitally sign messages using 
public-key and symmetric key cryptography methods. The OpenPGP standard itself is 
generally considered to be very secure and effective; however, problems do exist with 
OpenPGP that have led to it not being widely adopted or used.  
 Generally, using OpenPGP to encrypt or sign e-mails requires a plug-in to an e-mail 
client. Unfortunately many users are not knowledgeable enough to realize that they need a 
plug-in, nor skilled enough to know how to download, setup and install it. Because of this, 
most users of PGP are either very skilled users that understand the vulnerabilities in the e-
mail system or corporate and government users who have been help by other knowledgeable 
users. Also, many Internet e-mail services do not support PGP at all. Figure 2 above shows 
an example of an e-mail service that cannot interpret PGP for the user. This means a 
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significant portion of users, including many small or medium-sized business users and home 
users, are left to fend for themselves. This is one reason it would be preferable to use e-mail 
protocols that integrate security from the start in an automatic way, instead of adding this 
functionality on as an afterthought. 
 Another problem with OpenPGP is you cannot necessarily definitively authenticate 
the sender of a message with a high level of trust[7]. This is because instead of a centralized 
certificate management, OpenPGP relies on a “web of trust” scheme. This works by allowing 
a user to have his public key signed and endorsed by other users who are willing to vouch for 
the former’s identity. While this scheme can work for some individuals, most users do not or 
cannot take the time required to build these trust relationships. Additionally, new users may 
not be immediately trusted until they have acquired a suitable reputation.  
2.1.2  S/MIME 
 S/MIME is another standard that is available to add confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, and non-repudiation to the current e-mail system [8, 9]. S/MIME is also 
considered to be secure; however, there are still obstacles preventing it from being 
implemented by the average user.  
 Unlike OpenPGP, S/MIME is integrated into many e-mail clients. The use of this 
functionality does require the creation of a certificate either by a public certificate authority 
or by an in-house authority. Because of this fact S/MIME is likely the closest method 
available today to truly secure e-mail. But as was discussed in the public/private key pair 
scenario, the creation of this certificate is not something that most users can do without some 
training or help from their IT support staff, and this is a major drawback of this mechanism. 
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 Additionally, most personal certificates only bind the certificate to an e-mail 
address—not an actual personal or business identity[10]. The lack of authentication means 
S/MIME is still vulnerable to an attacker who creates an address that may appear legitimate, 
when in reality it is not. Because of the state of e-mail technology, it can be very difficult to 
tell the difference between e-mail messages that have been signed using a certificate attached 
to a verified identity as opposed to a certificate who owner has not verified their identity.  
This problem is at the heart of most e-mail security issues. If we intend to continue to use e-
mail for confidential or sensitive information, it is important that we move towards a system 
that allows us to definitively determine the actual identity of the sender, instead of just the e-
mail address and the claimed identity of the sender.  
2.2  Recent Developments 
 Several companies and organizations have also been researching new ways to help 
secure the e-mail system. Two new security frameworks, DomainKeys Identified Mail and 
Sender-ID, will be discussed here. Both of these methods attempt to authenticate the domain 
from which the e-mail is being sent by using special DNS records; however, neither provides 
any new means for providing confidentiality or user-to-user authentication. 
2.2.1  DomainKeys Identified Mail 
 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) is a combination of work by Yahoo! and Cisco 
that was created with the goal to design a server-to-server authenticated mail system[11]. 
DKIM's goals included not requiring new protocols or public key infrastructure (PKI). By 
not requiring new protocols or infrastructure, DKIM was not able to provide integrated user-
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to-user authentication nor any form of confidentiality.  DKIM can be used with other forms 
of user-to-user signatures and encryption schemes, such as S/MIME and PGP, but as 
mentioned before these options are generally too difficult to setup and use for many average 
users. 
 Although DKIM seems to be innovative work that would help to cut down some 
amounts of spam and phishing, it still relies on outdated protocols and technologies and is 
only a partial solution to e-mail's security problem. Problems arise because domains are 
allowed to sign their e-mails with their own certificates, so phishing could still occur and 
possibly appear more legitimate. For example, if a malicious user owns the ebay-
security.com domain, they could create their own certificate and sign their own e-mails to 
make them look valid. With DKIM, the user would be assured that the e-mail did in fact 
come from the ebay-security.com domain so this may actual increase the likelihood that they 
would take this e-mail seriously. Proponents of DKIM hope that with this technique ISPs and 
e-mail providers will create a system to evaluate the trust level of each individual domain to 
help make a determination as to whether the e-mail is legitimate or not. Unfortunately, even 
if DKIM becomes widely used and if this new trust evaluation system was implemented 
succesfully, it would still be relatively easy for malicious users to start using random 
domains, such as m43dfhr4dc.com, for a period of time until it has eroded its trust level. 
Although a random domain would fool a smaller percentage of the population, there are 
certainly still users who do not pay attention to this information and would be fooled.  
 Further, DKIM relies on DNS for distributing public keys instead of utilizing 
certificate authorities (CAs). This allows DKIM to be implemented without new PKI; 
however, this also means that the systems still relies on the accuracy and security of DNS in 
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order to verify a domain's identity. This does not seem to add much security over a scheme 
commonly used today of using a reverse lookup on the sender's IP address. It is well known 
that DNS responses can be forged, and this would seem to compromise the security of either 
of these schemes[12].  
2.2.2  Sender-ID 
 Microsoft has undertaken another effort to help fight spam called Sender-ID[13]. This 
framework is similar to DKIM in that it attempts to authenticate the domain from which an e-
mail was sent, again using a special DNS record called a Sender Policy Framework (SPF) 
record. Using Sender-ID, upon receiving an e-mail the inbound mail server uses DNS to 
lookup the SPF record. If the IP address of the outbound mail server matches any of the IP 
addresses listed in the domain's SPF record, this verifies the identity of the outbound mail 
server's domain. 
 This scheme has problems similar to those of DKIM. The Sender-ID framework still 
does nothing to address the needs of confidentiality or user-to-user authentication. Also, the 
Sender-ID authentication is still reliant on the security of DNS and the domain itself is again 
responsible for creating and maintaining the SPF records. Without a having a third-party 
involved to help determine the legitimacy of the domain sending the e-mail, the ebay-
security.com problem mentioned previously would still be possible. Finally, Microsoft's 
Sender-ID scheme does not use digital signatures or any other form of PKI in order to verify 
the integrity of the message or the IP address of the outgoing mail server.
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CHAPTER 3.  MOTIVATION 
As previously mentioned, solutions are available (although not widely implemented) 
to solve many of the problems with e-mail today.  However, current solutions are too 
difficult to implement and understand for most computer users.  Further, current e-mail 
technologies seem to place too much burden on the users who too often are not able to setup, 
maintain, or understand the security mechanisms that could keep their information secure. In 
fact, according to one estimate, 90% of businesses have failed to enable the SSL or TLS 
features of simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP)[14]. Although using SSL would not 
provide complete security to e-mail, it would at least provide encryption when messages are 
transferred between mail servers.  
These problems have lead to these security technologies only being adopted and used 
by a relatively small number of e-mail users, generally those who are disproportionately 
experienced and knowledgeable in the area of information security. For the most part, 
computer security experts are not the individuals who fall prey to phishing and other e-mail 
spoofing problems; instead it is the average computer users who are unaware of the security 
problems and ways to mitigate these risks that are unable to protect themselves. 
 Further complications arise because all previously developed solutions to the 
problems with e-mail seem to rely on modifications or add-ons to the old, insecure protocols. 
Although it is necessary to recognize that major changes to protocols are expensive, causing 
significant increases to the learning curve and labor, it seems that in order to improve the 
security of e-mail, we must recognize that the current e-mail technology is broken in terms of 
security, and it may be time to look at a new solution. Now seems to be an opportune 
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moment for the development of such a solution because of the international attention being 
given to information security problems. E-mail has become a ubiquitous technology, and if 
the general public better understood the risks of e-mail, most would likely be ready for a new 
solution. 
 While a partial solution to this problem would be to just refrain from sending 
confidential information through e-mail, this seems unlikely to happen. Many people do not 
understand the security risks of using e-mail for confidential information, and even though 
many organizations such have banks have made it their policy not to send confidential 
information through e-mail, their users still fall prey to phishing attacks. Regardless of the 
security threats, many industry experts expect e-mail to be the default method of 
communication for confidential data by 2009[15]. For these reasons, it seems imperative that 
a better solution be developed that allows messages to be sent in a confidential manner, while 
verifying the integrity of the messages and the actual identity of the sender. 
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CHAPTER 4.  APPROACH 
 This section will explain and justify the approach and goals that will be used in order 
to find a resolution to the problem of e-mail security. First, this new system involves a new 
protocol that inherently requires all communications to be secure. This was done through the 
addition of a specialized certificate server and certificate extension that can be used to verify 
the identity of senders as well as their relationship with organizations such a businesses or 
the government. In addition, several mail client implementation suggestions will be given in 
order to maximize the usefulness of the new protocols and security features without requiring 
more work by the user. Putting research into these areas simultaneously seemed necessary 
because computer security starts and ends with the users, and information security 
professionals must find a way to make the technology “fit” the users (because the users are 
rarely able to fit the technology). Also, a major inadequacy of current e-mail technologies is 
their lack of “in-depth” security. In order to secure the e-mail system, a system must be 
developed that integrates security in every step of the process without requiring additional 
work from the users.  
4.1  Goals 
There are three main goals that will be used in creating this new e-mail system: 
creating a system that is automatically very secure, ensuring ease of use even for non-
technical users, and allowing extensibility for future development. 
Because security is a main goal, it is clear that use of existing e-mail protocols would 
not be acceptable. These protocols are very insecure by default and this makes it difficult to 
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say with any certainty that a message can be transmitted in a confidential fashion. Current 
methods of encrypting e-mail generally include one of two approaches: using PKI to encrypt 
the message at the time it is sent or using a wrapper of encryption when the message is 
actually transmitted. While both of these methods are useful, neither are being widely 
implemented and therefore are ineffective. 
The first method generally requires the recipient to have a pre-established 
public/private key pair that can be used to encrypt the message, and the public key also must 
be available to the sender. Although this idea is not bad, and, in fact, is part of the solution 
presented in this paper, most e-mail users currently do not have key pairs, so this method is 
currently only effective for a small number of individuals. This is because of a combination 
of factors including lack of knowledge, the difficulty surrounding obtaining certificates, lack 
of effective infrastructure for sharing public keys, lack of technical skill required to correctly 
configure a mail client, and the simple fact that key pairs and certificates are not required to 
use e-mail and thus seem unnecessary. 
 The second method commonly used to protect e-mail is using an encryption wrapper. 
While this works well for some tasks, such as transferring web pages using secure sockets 
layer (SSL) or transport layer security (TLS)[16] between the client and the server, e-mail is 
a more complicated program which usually requires transferring data through multiple 
servers before delivering data to the recipients.  In order for SSL or TLS to start to be 
effective for protecting message confidentiality, all (or at least most) mail servers would need 
to have this functionality enabled and have keys generated.  Since, as previously mentioned, 
most SMTP server administrators have not taken this step, and there is no way for a user to 
guarantee that a message would be encrypted by all servers on the way to the message’s 
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destination, this approach does not translate well for protecting e-mail.  
Another reason SSL works well for web traffic is that when a web page is requested 
there are generally only two parties that are communicating directly, the web server and the 
web client. Both parties can negotiate encryption methods at the beginning of their 
connection. In this type of a connection, the client is generally the last stop for the data.  With 
e-mail however, there are usually at least four parties: the sender’s mail client, the sender’s 
outgoing mail server, the receiver’s incoming mail server, and the recipient’s mail client. 
Since neither the sender nor the recipient can control the communication through all of these 
steps, they cannot even ensure that encryption will be used at each transmission. And since 
most mail servers do not encrypt the data they are transmitting, this method does not 
adequately protect message confidentiality. The new protocols designed address these 
problems and help ensure that every message is properly encrypted for confidentiality and 
digitally signed for integrity and authentication. 
Figure 3 below shows that a web client can ensure that traffic is encrypted all the way 
from itself to the web server and back. Compare this to Figure 1 on page 3 above which 
shows how a standard e-mail client cannot be sure of this. 
 
Figure 3.  SSL for Web Traffic 
 As previously mentioned, the second goal of the new e-mail system is usability. This 
will be accomplished through new certificate handling procedures and mail client designs. 
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The new system should allow a new user to setup their secure e-mail with little or no 
additional effort, although it will require the additional step of requiring a new user to verify 
their identity before setting up a mail account. In addition, the system will provide a way for 
a message recipient to know not only the identity of the user that sent the message, but will 
also automatically show the recipient whether the sender is from a business, government 
entity, or just sending a personal message. 
 Finally, extensibility will be important to allow for new functionality and different 
uses. Although e-mail is currently extremely popular, recent surveys show, especially in 
younger generation, a trend towards more instant messaging-type technologies, both 
computer-based and mobile device-based. Hopefully, the new message system should 
translate with minor modifications into an instant messaging environment. The main limiting 
fact for this would be the processing and storage requirements of the messaging client. After 
implementation further research would be needed to gauge these requirements. 
4.2  New Messaging Protocols  
 Central to the development of a new messaging system will be a new protocol for 
sending, receiving, and delivering messages. Currently most e-mail is sent using the Simple 
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), which was defined in RFCs 821 in 1982[17], or Extended 
SMTP (ESMTP), which was later defined in RFC 1869 in 1995[18]. Although ESMTP 
introduced several improvements to SMTP, including allowing for sender authentication and 
encrypted communication using TLS, these are, in practice, not used widely. For message 
retrieval several different protocols are used, among the most common being POP3[19] and 
IMAP[20]. Again, although both protocols have been updated to support encrypted 
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authentication and communication, in practice these are still often not utilized. 
 This setup of having one (or several) protocols to send and forward e-mail messages 
between servers and then using several different protocols for message retrieval begs the 
question, “Why are so many protocols necessary?” In essence, SMTP, ESMTP, POP3 and 
IMAP are all ways to perform the same basic task: moving an e-mail message from one 
system to another. So why can’t there be one protocol that could be used as a standard for 
sending, receiving and delivering e-mail messages? The best answer to this question is likely 
that these protocols are artifacts of how the e-mail has always been setup. Although a single 
protocol replacing these other protocols would need to have several modes of operation—
allowing users to send e-mail, servers to route this e-mail to the destination, and enabling the 
recipients to retrieve the e-mail—these processes all transfer the same type of data and 
majority of the protocol could be reused. Then, instead of having four or more different 
protocols, each with different security abilities and vulnerabilities, one protocol could be 
standardized that focuses on being secure and easy to use. Figure 4 below shows a possible 
path for an e-mail message, along with protocols that could be used for each step. Note how 
different protocols could be used at each step, limiting the control a user has over how a 
message is handled. 
 
Figure 4.  Simplified E-mail Path with Possible Protocols 
 In order to maximize the functionality and extensibility of this new protocol, 
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Extensible Markup Language (XML)[21] will be used for all network communications. 
Using XML will allow the protocols to easily share a basic syntax that can be used to 
communicate information between different kinds of servers and applications without 
needing to convert this information into different format. Also, XML can easily be modified 
to fit the task at hand. Finally, XML can be stored in a database format which allows the data 
to easily be queried and retrieved. This prevents the need for excessive conversions between 
different types of data structures and storage formats.  
4.3  Mail Clients  
 Along with new e-mail protocols, another challenge will be ensuring the user 
interface of the mail client is extremely clear and easy to understand. In order to cater to 
users who are not savvy enough to understand the need for and methods of security, mail 
clients will need to make security functions as a completely integrated part of the system 
from the very beginning. First, the mail client will need to have a secure but easy way for 
users to setup their new e-mail accounts. This will include automatically creating a 
public/private key pair in order to allow for encryption and digital signatures to be handled 
without any additional user interaction. In addition, there needs to be an easy or automatic 
method to obtain the user’s certificate, signed by a certificate authority to prove identity, as 
well as the certificates for other mail senders and recipients. 
 Finally, the mail client must make the security level of message clear to the user. Any 
problems, such as expired or revoked certificates, must be prominently noted to the user and 
the implications of such problems must be explained to the user in an easy to understand 
way. 
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            Figure 5 above shows a possible inbox representation for a mail client in this system. 
Notice how each message in the inbox is labeled with text and an icon indicating the type of 
certificate used to sign the message. The messages are also color-coded according to this 
certificate type. Also, above the current message being displayed, the same information and 
color-code is used to indicate this same information to the user. This should make clear to the 
user where the message is coming from and help to ensure malicious users cannot 
misrepresent their id. 
4.4  Certificate Infrastructure 
 In order to create a more secure e-mail system, some changes to the current certificate 
and public key infrastructure (PKI) should be made. These include modifications that could 
be used to help identify users, as well as a new way of handling certificates that would make 
it easier for a user to automatically obtain or validate certificates. It will also be necessary for 
anyone who uses the secure message system to have a certificate that can be validated 
through a trusted certificate authority (CA). This will allow users to easily and automatically 
digitally sign and encrypt messages, and users will be able to trust the claimed identity since 
user’s identities will be verified by a CA. 
 The current state of e-mail allows certificate signing to be an add-on or an option. The 
problem with this is that most users are not aware of this option, its implications, or even 
how to undertake its use. If instead there were a system where security was integrated from 
the start and creating a public/private key pair and obtaining a certificate was part of the 
process of setting up a mail account, users could know that they are sending all of their 
messages securely on the system. 
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With e-mail there are too many questions: do recipients have public/private key pairs 
setup so the message can be encrypted, are the public keys shared in a public location or 
otherwise available, does the sender have a key pair to digitally sign the message, is the 
sender’s mail client setup correctly to handle the key pair, is the sender’s mail server setup to 
handle encrypted communications, is the recipient’s mail server setup to handled encrypted 
communications, etc. With a system this complicated, it is unlikely that mass adoption of 
these security tools will ever take place. 
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CHAPTER 5.  DESIGN 
This section will describe the basic elements that will be used in order to develop the 
secure mail system and how these elements fit together. 
5.1  Architecture 
 In order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication to the secure mail 
system, three basic components will be necessary: certificate servers, mail servers, and 
clients. A mail server and certificate server could reside on the same machine at the same IP 
address; however, this will not be assumed. The certificate servers will be responsible for 
creating, storing, and retrieving certificates. The mail servers will be required to accept 
outgoing messages from clients, forward these messages to mail servers of the recipients, and 
deliver the messages to the recipients as requested. In the secure mail system, a mail server 
refers to what would be two separate services in a traditional e-mail system and acts as both 
an incoming and outgoing mail server. So, when a client connects to the server, it may 
choose to send messages, retrieve messages, or both. This removes an unnecessary layer of 
complexity by consolidating sending e-mail and receiving e-mail into one protocol and one 
server. The client application will provide users the means to interface with the mail servers 
and certificate service. The client will also be used to setup a mail account, as well as send 
and receive messages. Figure 6 below shows the basic architecture of the secure message 
system. In this example, one client connects to separate mail and certificate servers, while the 
other client connects to a combined certificate and mail server. 
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Figure 6.  Basic Architecture 
5.1.1  Certificate Server 
Certificate servers are the core of what makes this new protocol secure. These servers 
will provide a network service that allows new certificates to be requested and existing 
certificates to be looked up over the Internet. For example, when a user wants to send a 
message, the recipient’s mail address will be used to determine at which server the 
recipient’s certificate is stored. The client will obtain the correct certificate from the 
appropriate server. 
 Two types of certificate servers will exist: subordinate certificate servers and root 
certificate servers. This is similar to the setup of many other certificate uses. Subordinate 
certificate servers will be required to have their own certificate which has been signed by a 
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root certificate server. This allows the clients to form a chain of trust ensuring the certificates 
they receive can be trusted and allowing the certificates to be bound to an actual identity. 
Subordinate certificate servers will be required to check the identity of any persons 
requesting to start a secure mail account. How this should be done is beyond the scope of this 
document; however, several methods could be imagined including procedures similar to 
those used by Verisign and other current certificate authorities before issuing certificates. It 
will also be necessary for the subordinate certificate server to issue certificates to the mail 
servers for the certificate server’s organization. This allows the mail servers to communicate 
in a secure manner as well.  Thus, both the users and the servers can communicate securely.   
Each certificate server will only be allowed to issue certificates for certain uses. For 
example, root certificate servers can issue certificates to subordinate certificate servers. 
Subordinate certificate servers cannot issue certificates to other certificate servers, but can 
issue certificates to mail servers and users. In addition, each server will only be allowed to 
issue certain types of certificates. These certificate types will be discussed in more detail 
later; however, their basic purpose is to allow users to easily tell what type of sender has sent 
each of their received messages and prevent users from spoofing their affiliation or status. 
Figure 7 below shows how this system works, with one or more root certificate servers that 
can issue certificates to subordinate certificate servers. This figure also shows how the 
subordinate certificate servers can all issue certificates to mail servers. These certificates 
allow the mail servers to authenticate and encrypt data over a TLS connection. In the figure, 
the subordinate servers are also shown to be able to issue certain types of user certificates. 
For example, the bank’s certificate server can issue Financial Institution User Certificates. 
This allows users to differentiate between messages sent from different types of users. This 
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way it would be much more difficult for a malicious user to use a fraudulent identity, such as 
that of a bank employee.  
 
Figure 7.  Certificate Servers Can Only Create Certain Certificates 
Clearly there would be the need for vigilance.  If a certificate server was not 
following the correct procedures in verifying identities, issuing certificates of the wrong type, 
or purposefully forging certificates, that server would have its own certificate revoked, 
effectively making any certificate created by the server useless. 
It should be noted that it will be assumed that there is a secure way to deliver the root 
certificates to the clients and mail servers, as these will be required in order to verify any 
other certificates. This assumption is made because this is currently already done in Internet 
browsers and other software that relies on certificates in order to allow the program to 
validate SSL or other types of certificates. 
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5.1.2  Mail Server 
Mail servers will serve three basic purposes that mirror the functions of current e-mail 
servers. First, the mail server will accept outgoing messages from clients. Next, these servers 
will route the messages to the recipient’s mail server. Finally, mail servers will be 
responsible for delivering messages to a client upon request.  
In simple terms, the mail servers will be used as an intermediate step for transferring 
mail messages between clients. Although it would be possible to design a protocol omitting 
the intermediate steps and allowing the clients to connect directly, offline users, firewalls, 
and network address translation would likely cause complications with this type of a scheme.  
In this protocol, the mail server will actually serve mostly the same purpose as those 
in a traditional e-mail system with a few modifications. First, instead of requiring two 
different services and two different protocols for sending messages and receiving messages 
as current e-mail standard do (for example, SMTP for sending messages, POP3 or IMAP for 
receiving), clients and servers will communicate using a single protocol. This allows the 
system’s complexity to be reduced by only relying on one approach for transferring messages 
between clients and servers. Using this single protocol will also help users ensure that 
messages will be sent over secure connections all the way from the sender’s client to the 
recipient’s client. As previously mentioned, this can be very difficult or impossible to 
guarantee over traditional e-mail.  
Another important difference between traditional e-mails systems and this system will 
be that the mail servers will always encrypt communications with clients and servers. This 
will be done using a TLS, allowing parties to mutually authenticate and provide encryption 
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on all communications. This means that no substantive information should be transmitted in 
clear text, including recipient addresses, message subjects, etc.  Figure 8 below shows how a 
mail server accepts, routes, and delivers messages. Note that here the same protocol is used 
for each step. This can be contrasted against a tradition e-mail server that may use different 
protocols at each step as shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Mail Server Functions 
5.1.3  Client 
The client application will be similar to an e-mail client such as Microsoft Outlook.  
However, for this protocol the client will have more responsibilities than a standard e-mail 
client, including encrypting and decrypting messages, acquiring and verifying certificates and 
creating and validating digital signatures. In addition, the client will need to interface with 
both the user’s certificate server and the user’s mail server. The certificate server will be used 
to acquire and verify certificates in order to send messages and verify the validity of received 
messages. The user’s mail server will be utilized in order to send messages and also to 
retrieve messages sent to the user. The client will also be responsible for creating the key pair 
and acquiring a certificate for a user when the user’s mail account is created. This process 
will be described in more detail in Section 6.1 below. 
Figure 9 below shows how the client connects to its certificate server for certificate 
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retrieval and validation and to its mail server to send and receive messages. If a message 
needs to be delivered to a recipient that uses another mail server, this is handled by the 
client’s mail server and not the client itself. Likewise, if the client tries to look up or verify a 
certificate for a client that resides on another certificate server, the certificate server will 
perform the action on the foreign certificate server, and return the result to the client. 
 
Figure 9.  Client functions 
 As with an e-mail client using SMTP and POP3, the client will initiate a connection 
to the mail server when it wants to send or receive messages; however, unlike standard e-
mail protocols, this can be done in one connection. In other words, when the client connects 
to its mail server, it can first request to receive any new messages that the mail server may be 
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holding, and once this has completed, the client can elect to send any messages that the user 
wants to send. Unlike current e-mail clients, before sending a message, the client will need to 
make a connection to its certificate server to either acquire or verify the certificate for the 
message’s recipient. In addition, when a message is received, the client will need to contact 
the user’s certificate server in order to verify the certificate associated with the received 
message. These processes will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.3. 
5.2  Certificates 
This protocol will make use of X.509 version 3 certificates[22] with the addition of a 
specialized subject alternative name extension that will be used to help identify the client, 
route messages, and provide a means of separating different types of messages. Each user 
will have a certificate that will verify their ownership of a private key and contain its 
associated public key. This key pair will be created by the client when setting up their 
account. After the key pair is created, the certificate will be acquired automatically. This will 
require that a user either verifies their identity at this time or that the user has already verified 
their identity to a certificate provider. Certificates will also be required for the mail servers 
and certificate servers. Appendix E below shows an example of a certificate created for a 
user of this system. 
5.2.1 Subject Alternative Name Extension 
The subject alternative name extension is a X.509 certificate extension that was 
created in order to allow for additional identities to be bound to a subject of a certificate. 
According to the X.509 version 3 standard, the contents of the subject alternative name 
  
30 
extension are considered definitively bound to the public key and must be verified by the CA. 
For this system, the subject alternative name extension will contain the following 
information: a version number, the name of the owner of the certificate, the alias of the 
owner of the certificate, and the certificate type. User certificates will also contain a mail 
server entry which will point to the fully qualified DNS address of the user’s mail server. 
Also for user certificates, the issuer may elect to include affiliation or title information. 
Certificate server certificates must also have a signer authentication value. Appendix F below 
shows the ASN.1 definition of the subject alternative name extension used in this system. 
Additionally, a sample of this extension can be seen at the end of the certificate in Appendix 
E. 
For certificates that use the system described in this document, the version number 
should be 1. The name of the owner would be the user’s full legal name in the case of a user 
certificate, or the name of the owning organization in the case of a server certificate. Aliases, 
which are the same as mail addresses, will be discussed in Section 5.3. Certificate types and 
signer authentication values will be discussed in 5.2.1.1. The affiliation and title values 
would be used, for example, by a company that issues certificates to its employees. The 
affiliation would allow the company to indicate that the user certificates they are created are 
for their employees. The title value would allow the company to give each user a specific 
title. This allows users to more easily identify who they are communicating with, and adds 
another layer of protection against identity spoofing. 
5.2.1.1  Certificate Types 
Certificate types will be used to tell what type of entity owns the public key 
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associated with a given certificate. For users, certificate types will make it easy to tell what 
type of sender has sent each of their received messages and will prevent users from spoofing 
their affiliation or associations. In other words certificate types are concerned with how 
entities are portraying themselves when they send mail messages, encrypt data, or sign data. 
Each certificate type may require a different level of identification validation depending on 
the security level of the certificate type. This system contains the eight certificate types listed 
in Table 1. 
Certificate Type Intended Use 
Personal Messages from an ordinary user.  
Business (General) Messages from a business. No financial information/transactions. 
E-Business  Messages from a business. May be used for financial transactions. 
Financial Institution Messages from a financial institution (such as banks).  
Government Messages from a government entity (such as the IRS). 
Mail Server Used by a mail server for TLS communication. 
Root certificate server Used by root certificate server to sign subordinate certificate server certificates 
and TLS. 
Subordinate certificate 
server 
Used by subordinate certificate servers to sign user and mail server certificates 
and TLS. 
Table 1.  Certificate Types 
Each of these eight certificate types has its own possible uses. Personal certificates could 
be used for sending secure personal communications between any two people (for example 
between family members or friends). A personal certificate would not be tied to any business 
or organization. A personal certificate could also be used by a customer sending a message to 
a business. A general business certificate could be used for a business that wants to 
communicate with customers or other businesses through secure messages but would not be 
used for anything financial (for example, soliciting account or payment information, sending 
e-bills, etc). An e-business certificate would have the same purposes as a general business 
certificate but would also allow the business to perform secure financial business. As the 
name suggests, financial institution certificates would be for identifying messages coming 
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from financial institutions such as bank, credit unions, brokerages, etc. The government 
certificate type could be used by a government in order to communicate official messages. 
For example, in the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may want to deliver 
tax related information to its citizens via internet mail. This type of a message would be 
signed with a government certificate in order to verify that the sender was actually part of the 
indicated government entity. The last three types of certificates are used as described in the 
table above. 
It is important to note that while the certificate type dictates the type of messages a 
user is allowed to send, it does not impact the type of messages the user can receive. So, 
while a personal user cannot send messages and appear to be a business user, that personal 
user could receive e-mail from users with any of the other types of certificates (for example, 
a personal user could receive a message from a user with a government certificate).  Also, the 
type of certificate does not affect the confidentiality, integrity, or authentication aspect of the 
message. In other words, messages sent by someone possessing a personal certificate would 
be encrypted and signed using the same method and key type of someone possessing a 
government certificate. It is not the intent of the certificate type to be used for securing data 
in different ways but rather to help a user determine exactly who a message is coming from 
and if the information contained within a message is valid coming from a specific sender. 
As mentioned before, certificate servers will only be allowed to issue certificates of 
certain types. This will allow users to easily ensure the message content they are receiving is 
valid coming from the type of user indicated by the certificate type. For example, if a user 
receives an e-mail requesting that he update his bank account information from a mail 
address linked to a personal certificate, clearly this is likely a fraudulent request. By using 
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Figure 5 on page 19 as an example, you can imagine what this may look like. Above the 
message it would clearly indicate the sender had used a personal certificate, instead of a 
financial institution certificate. There would also be no bank name or title shown. Similarly, 
if a user receives a message signed by a government certificate, but the certificate server that 
has signed the certificate is only authorized to sign personal certificates, the message and the 
certificate is likely fraudulent. In this case, the client should automatically detect this, and 
would not display the message. A subordinate certificate server that is signing certificates 
that it is not authorized to sign would need to have its certificate revoked by the root 
certificate server as it would not be acting in accordance to the rules of the protocol. These 
certificate types will be an integral part of the secure mail system. By having this information 
readily available, it will make it much easier for the user to determine when an e-mail is 
likely not from a legitimate sender. 
An additional related piece of the subject alternative name extension is the 
SigningAuth value. This value is used to specify which types of certificates a given 
certificate server is allowed to create. Each of the certificate types is given a value as shown 
in Table 2 below. The values that a given server is allowed to sign are added up and inserted 
in to the subject alternative extension as an integer. This allows users to verify that the 
signing certificate was indeed allowed to sign certificates of a given type.  
SigningAuth Value Certificate Type 
1 Personal 
2 Business (General) 
4 E-Business  
8 Financial Institution 
16 Government 
32 Mail Server 
64 Subordinate Certificate Server 
Table 2.  SigningAuth Values 
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5.3  Mail Addresses (Aliases) 
A client’s mail address will be similar to a standard e-mail address (for example, 
user@domain) except the fully qualified DNS name of the certificate server where the user’s 
certificate is stored will replace the domain which is used today. This allows any client that 
has another user’s mail address to contact the correct certificate server in order to acquire or 
verify the user’s certificate. The certificate will then contain the extension informing the 
client of the address of the mail server that should be used for the particular mail recipient. 
This method seems to be the easiest method of allowing client to look-up other users’ 
certificates even if the only information they have about their intended recipient is their mail 
address. In other words, the only information a user would need to send a message to a 
second user would be that second user’s mail address, just as in standard e-mail. For 
example, if I wanted to send a message to my friend, Charlie, and I knew his mail address 
was charlie@cert.maildomain.com, I could simply type this address in, and my client would 
be able to retrieve his certificate. First, my client would contact my certificate server and 
provide the mail address, charlie@cert.maildomain.com. The certificate server would look at 
Charlie’s certificate server’s DNS name, “cert.maildomain.com”, and contact the certificate 
server to retrieve Charlie’s certificate. After the certificate has been retrieved, my certificate 
server would deliver this certificate to me. The certificate would then point to the Charlie’s 
mail server. 
5.4  Encryption 
Encryption will be important in this protocol in order to provide confidential 
communication. The goal of the encryption methods used will be to ensure that only 
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information is revealed on a “need-to-know” basis. In other words, a mail server has no need 
to see the text within a mail message’s body or an attachment. This information should be 
available only to the recipients. The mail server would need other information about the 
message, however. For example, when a user sends a message, the mail server will need to 
be able to access the list of recipients of the message. Otherwise, the server would be unable 
to route the message on to the next mail server for the recipients. In contrast, an eavesdropper 
should not be allowed to gain access to any of this data. Because of this, different types of 
data will be encrypted in different ways and at different times. This section will attempt to 
summarize how and when encryption will be used. 
Asymmetric encryption will mainly be used as a way of authenticating two parties to 
each other. Since each entity has a public/private key pair and a certificate containing their 
public key, these can be used as a way of setting up a secure connection. This will be done 
using the transport layer security (TLS) algorithm. In this protocol, the two parties can also 
be mutually authenticated in almost all cases since all entities should have their own key pair 
and certificate. The only exception to this would be when a server or user is first requesting 
to have their public key signed. This situation is discussed later in Section 6.1.1.  
Figure 10 shows how asymmetric encryption works. Note that although the public 
and private keys are different, they must be part of the same key pair. The owner of the keys 
can publicize the public key, but must keep the private key to himself (hence the names). 
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Figure 10.  Asymmetric Encryption  
It is possible for a user to prove ownership of a key pair in a number of ways. First, 
she could be requested to encrypt a given set of data using her private key. Once this is done, 
anyone would be able to decrypt the data using her public key, and, if the decrypted data 
matches the original data, then only the owner of the private key could have done the 
encryption. The other way to prove ownership of a key pair is by having another user encrypt 
something with your public key, and then decrypting it with your private key. This works 
because only someone that knows the correct private key corresponding to your public key 
would be able to decrypt the data. This is why it is important to keep private keys secret.  
The TLS protocol basically works by allowing two communicating parties to secretly 
create a symmetric key which is then used to encrypt data being exchanged. The parties are 
also authenticated through their ability to use their private key to decrypt secrets that have 
been encrypted with the public keys associated with their certificate. This type of an 
exchange will take place at the beginning of all network communications including 
certificate lookup between a client and a certificate server, sending a message from a client to 
a mail server or between two mail servers, and when a client retrieves his messages. In later 
sections, when information exchange between servers and clients is discussed, it can be 
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assumed that a TLS session had first been established in order to encrypt the data 
transmissions. Figure 11 below shows an example of symmetric key encryption. Notice here 
the two keys are identical. 
 
Figure 11.  Symmetric Key Encryption 
While using TLS helps ensure an eavesdropper cannot garner any information 
exchanged over the network, it does not provide end-to-end encryption, nor does it prevent a 
mail server from accessing the data within a mail message. Because of this, it will be 
necessary for a client to encrypt messages before sending them. This will be done by 
generating a symmetric key and encrypting this key with the recipient’s public key. This will 
ensure that only the intended recipient is able to read the key and decrypt the message.  
Figure 12 shows the encryption process a sender must go through before proceeding 
to send a message. This includes generating a symmetric key, encrypting the message using 
the generated key, and finally encrypting the symmetric key using the recipient’s public key.  
Figure 13 shows the decryption process that the recipient must go through in order to decrypt 
the message. First, the recipient must receive the encrypted message and encrypted key. The 
recipient will first decrypt the key using his private key. 
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Figure 12.  Encrypting a Message to be Sent 
Once the symmetric key has been recovered, the recipient can proceed to decrypt the 
encrypted message using the symmetric key. This symmetric key would then be discarded, 
and any future communications would take place using a newly generated symmetric key. 
 
Figure 13.  Decrypting a Received Message 
Using these methods in order to encrypt communications will ensure that entities are 
only provided with information that is required for them to fulfill their function. Further, 
these techniques should prevent an eavesdropper from gathering any information including 
the recipients, subject, or body of any messages being sent. 
5.5  Digital Signatures 
 A digital signature will be sent with each message to ensure that no changes to the 
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message take place during transit and to authenticate the sender to the recipient. This will be 
done by enclosing a hashed copy of the message encrypted with the sender’s private key. 
Figure 14 below shows the process of creating a digital signature as previously described. In 
this system, the mail message, which will include the subject, timestamp, message, and the 
sender’s certificate will all be hashed together using the hash function. This data will then be 
encrypted using the sender’s private key. This signature will be sent to the recipient, along 
with the message encrypted with the symmetric key as described in Section 5.4. 
 
Figure 14.  Digital Signature Creation 
Once a recipient has received a message, she will have to verify the signature to 
ensure that the message hasn’t been tampered with. To do this, first the recipient must 
recover the original message. This recovered message is then hashed in the same way as the 
sender previously hashed the message. The recipient then must decrypt the digital signature 
using the sender’s public key. This should result in the same hash value as the one she had 
generated.  
The two hashes are compared, and, if they match, the recipient knows the message 
has not been changed. Also, since the public key used to verify the signature is associated 
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with a certificate, this allows the recipient to verify the identity of the sender. Figure 15 
below shows this process. 
 
Figure 15.  Checking a Digital Signature 
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CHAPTER 6.  USE CASES AND PROCEDURES 
This section will describe in more detail how each of the components of the secure 
messaging system will work. Specifically, the workings of the certificate servers, mail 
servers, and client applications will be addressed. For each of the processes that requires 
network communication, XML schemas have been created for the socket commands. These 
schema files and a sample XML exchange can be seen in Appendix G. Additionally 
flowchart for how and when each XML command can be sent are located in Appendix H. 
6.1  Certificate Server 
This section will describe how the certificate server will interface with other 
applications. This will include how the certificate server will be used to create, retrieve, 
validate, or revoke certificates. This section will also discuss how certificate servers are 
initially setup. 
6.1.1  Certificate Creation 
Certificate creation will need to take place anytime a new server or user is added to 
the secure mail system. This will generally be done by sending a signing request to a 
certificate server. Specifically, when a new user or mail server is created, it will need to 
request its subordinate certificate server to sign its public key. When a new subordinate 
certificate server is created, it will need to have a root server sign its public key. One 
exception to this would be root certificate servers, whose certificate would be self-signed. 
Because of this, care must be taken to ensure that all involved parties can keep an accurate 
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and unaltered list of valid root certificate servers. Requests will be sent to the certificate 
server through the network, and if the request is valid and authorized, a certificate will be 
sent back to the requestor and also stored on the certificate server for future retrieval. Figures 
detailing each step of this process are contained in Appendix A below. 
In order for a certificate to be issued, the requestor must first be authenticated. This 
could either be done prior to the request (a pre-authenticated request) or possibly at the time 
of the request. The methods of authentication are outside the scope of this document; 
however, current public services such as online tax filing, credit report lookup, and certificate 
purchasing could be used as models to develop these procedures. This document will assume 
the user or server has been pre-authenticated. This could be done in person, through the 
postal service, or possibly through other methods.  
Assuming the certificate request will be a pre-authenticated request, the requestor, 
whether it be a certificate server, mail server, or user, will have proven his or her identity to 
the owner of the certificate server which will issue the certificate. This would have been done 
at another time, before the creation of the request for the certificate. When the requestor 
authenticates to the issuer, for example, when a user signs up for a secure mail account, the 
requestor will be given their alias (alias generation will be discussed in Section 6.1.1.2) and 
an id number. The id number is a random integer that is used when requesting the certificate 
in order to help authenticate the user to the server. When a user actually goes to setup the 
account in the client program, they will be prompted for their secure mail address and this id 
number. These pieces of information will be hashed together and sent in the request to the 
appropriate certificate server. The certificate server will use this hashed value to lookup the 
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user’s information. If the user’s information cannot be found, this means that the user is not 
pre-authenticated to this certificate server or the information entered by the user was 
incorrect, and the request is invalid. If the server can find the user, the certificate server will 
respond with user’s information. Since the server not been sent this information before, this 
demonstrate that the server actually does a record of the user, and that the user is connected 
to the correct server. 
This process will allow the issuing certificate server to lookup and verify the identity 
of the requestor, and the requestor will be able to verify the identity of the certificate server. 
This prevents the possibility of a malicious user from posing as legitimate user in order to 
falsely acquire the legitimate user’s certificate 
After the authentication takes place, the requestor must send a PKCS #10 formatted 
certificate request[23] to the certificate server (see Figure 16 for an example). The server will 
check the request to ensure that the information in the request is correct. If so, the certificate 
will be created and signed by the certificate server. The newly created certificate will then be 
stored on the certificate server and sent to the client.  
 
Figure 16.  Sample PKCS#10 Certification Request 
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6.1.1.2  Aliases 
 In order to have a standardized method of looking up certificates, aliases will be used 
for each certificate. The alias generation will depend upon the type of certificate being 
issued. For a mail user, the alias will be the mail address of the user, for example 
“user@certserver.domain.com”. As mentioned previously, the mail address includes the fully 
qualified DNS name of the user’s certificate server after the ‘@’ symbol. This allows a user’s 
certificate to be looked-up using only the mail address. A certificate server will use the string 
“CS:” followed by its own fully qualified DNS name as its alias. This way any party that 
needs the certificate server’s certificate can look it up if it simply knows the DNS name of 
the server. Finally, mail servers will use the string “MS:” followed by the fully qualified 
DNS name of the server. Appended to this is an “@” symbol along with the fully qualified 
DNS name of the server’s certificate server, for example 
“MS:mailserver.domain.com@certserver.domain.com”. The strings “MS” and “CS” allow 
mail and certificate servers to be distinguished from each other in the case where they reside 
on the same host.  
Figure 17 below shows how using an alias alone can allow a message to be delivered 
to a user. The alias points to the certificate server where the user’s certificate is stored. The 
certificate will indicate where the user’s messages should be sent. Once the message is 
delivered to this server, the user will be able to pick up the message here. 
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Figure 17.  Path from Alias to User 
6.1.1.3 Distinguished Names 
Another piece of information that is used to create certificates is the distinguished 
name (DN). This provides a way of uniquely identifying a certificate. DNs are made up of 
pairs of attributes and values. Each certificate uses two DNs: the subject DN which is used to 
identify the owner of the certificate, and the issuer DN which identifies the certificate server 
that has issued the certificate.  
This system will use the following attributes: type, name, host, and domain. The type 
attribute will be used to identify what type of entity the certificate is for. All distinguished 
names will use this attribute, and it will take the appropriate value from the following values: 
“Root Certificate Server”, “Subordinate Certificate Server”, “Mail Server”, or “User”. The 
name attribute will only be used for user’s certificates and will be set to the user’s mail 
address. The host and domain attributes will be used to identify mail and certificate servers. 
These will simply be set to the host name and the domain name for the certificate owner. The 
table below shows examples of subject DNs for each of the different types of entities 
Entity Type Subject DN 
Root Certificate Server type=Root Certificate Server, host=rootCS, domain=domain.com 
Subordinate Certificate 
Server 
type=Subordinate Certificate Server, host=subCS, 
domain=domain.com 
Mail Server type=Mail Server, host=MS, domain=domain.com 
User type=User, name=john@subCS.domain.com 
Table 3.  Example DNs 
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6.1.2  Certificates Retrieval 
When a user wants to send a message, the client needs to lookup the recipient’s 
certificate. After a certificate is used, it will be saved in the client application. If a certificate 
has been previously saved, the client will use the certificate validation steps described in the 
next section to verify that the certificate is still valid and has not been revoked. If the 
certificate is not saved or is found to be invalid, the certificate will be retrieved using the 
user’s certificate server. Figures for each step of this process are shown in Appendix B 
below. 
A request is created that contains the alias of the certificate needed, and this is sent to 
the certificate server. The certificate server will first check to see if it is the issuer of the 
certificate in question. If so, it will lookup the certificate using the alias provided and return it 
to the requestor. If the certificate server is not the issuer of the requested certificate, it will 
check its cache for a copy of the certificate. If the certificate is in cache, it will need to ensure 
the certificate is valid. This is done using the certificate validation procedure described in the 
next section. If the certificate is valid, it will be given to the client.  
If the certificate is not in cache or the cached certificate is not valid, for example 
because it has expired or been revoked, the certificate server will attempt to retrieve the new 
certificate for the recipient.  This is done by sending a request to the certificate server that 
issued the recipient’s certificate. This is possible since, as mentioned in Section 6.1.1.2, the 
DNS name of the issuing certificate server is contained in the alias or mail address of the 
user. If this request is successful, the certificate server will perform an additional step to 
verify that the certificate used by the remote certificate when signing the user’s certificate has 
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not been revoked. This process is described further in Section 6.1.4.  
If the user’s certificate server is able to find a valid certificate for the requested mail 
recipient, this certificate will be given to the client. If a valid certificate cannot be found, the 
server will alert the client of this, and the user will be unable to send a mail message. This 
could happen if one of the certificate is unavailable, if a certificate has been revoked without 
replacement, or if the secure mail user does not exist. 
6.1.3  Certificate Validation 
Each time another user’s certificate is used, such as when sending a message to 
another user or when receiving a message, the certificate must be validated. The first step in 
the process is ensuring the certificate is a valid certificate. This means that the certificate is 
the proper format, X.509 version 3, contains the correct extensions, is signed by a 
subordinate certificate server whose certificate was signed by a known root certificate server, 
and, obviously, that the certificate is in a format that the application can interpret.  
Next, the application must verify that the certificate is within its validity period. Each 
certificate that is issued is only valid for a certain time range, referred to as the validity 
period. If the current time is outside of this validity period when the user needs to use the 
certificate, the client program will use the procedure in Section 6.1.2 to attempt to retrieve an 
updated certificate. 
Another check that must be done is to ensure the certificate is being used correctly. 
This statement has several meanings. For example, a mail server’s certificate cannot be used 
to send mail messages—only user certificates can be used for this purpose; a mail server 
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cannot use a user certificate for encrypting traffic when a user tries to send a message, a user 
certificate cannot be used to sign another user certificate, and so on. Each of the three 
components of the mail system (certificate server, mail server, and mail client) has a unique 
type of certificate, and these certificates can only be used in the way they are intended. 
Also, when validating a certificate for a sender when receiving a message, a client 
will need to ensure that the certificate type contained in the sender’s certificate was issued by 
a certificate server that has the authority to issue that type of certificate. For example, if a 
bank wanted to have its own subordinate certificate server to issue certificates to its 
employees, this certificate server would probably not be allowed to create certificates with 
the “government” type. Another example would be an ISP that caters primarily to home users 
and wants to provide secure mail to its clients. This ISP’s certificate server would most likely 
only be allowed to create personal certificates. The concept of certificate type is discussed in 
more detail in Section 5.2.1. 
Another step in validating a certificate is ensuring that it has not been revoked. If a 
client has just retrieved a certificate from its certificate server for the first time, this process 
does not need to take place as it is checked by the certificate server. However, on subsequent 
uses of this certificate, the client will need to perform this step. This process is explained in 
the next section, 6.1.4. 
6.1.4  Certificate Revocation 
When working with certificates, it is sometimes necessary to invalidate an already 
issued certificate. This may occur for a variety of reasons, such as a private key being 
compromised or misuse of a certificate. In this system a certificate can be revoked by the 
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administrator of its issuing certificate server.  
In cases where a certificate is revoked, it is important that this information be 
communicated to any entity that may need the invalidated certificate. For example, if a user 
wants to send a message to a recipient whose certificate has been revoked and reissued, 
somehow, this sender must know that there is a new certificate available. This is generally 
done in one of two ways: Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) or Online Certificate Status 
Protocol (OCSP)[24]. This protocol will use an approach similar to OCSP in order to check 
the status of certificates instead of CRLs. OCSP has the advantage of allowing a certificate’s 
status to be checked at anytime.  This offers a more real time solution and does not required 
large CRLs to be transferred on a regular basis.  
Using this type of a real time certificate check also gives a higher level of security to 
the protocol. This is because CRLs most likely could not be distributed on a real-time basis. 
Instead, certificate servers would most likely store any revocations until a certain time, say 
once each day, and then they would be distributed. During this time where the certificate 
revocations are being held and until the CRLs can be distributed to all certificate servers, it 
would be possible that a revoked certificate would still be in use.  
Checking the revocation status of a certificate will only be required if the client has 
already acquired the certificate since the certificate server automatically validates the 
certificate upon a retrieval request. The procedure for checking the status of a certificate will 
require two pieces of information: the certificate alias and a hash of the certificate, both of 
which can be obtained from the certificate in question. In order to illustrate the method of 
certificate validate, take the case where a user wants to send a message to a recipient. In this 
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case, there are really two certificates that must be validated: the recipient’s certificate and the 
certificate used to sign the recipient’s certificate. The sender will give the aforementioned 
information for these two certificates to the sender’s own subordinate certificate server. This 
certificate server will first check to see if it issued the certificate for the recipient in question. 
If so, it will check the status and reply to the requestor. If the certificate server did not issue 
the recipient’s certificate, it will first want to validate that the recipient’s subordinate 
certificate server used a valid certificate when signing the certificate in question. This 
validation will be done by sending a validation request to the recipient’s subordinate 
certificate server’s root certificate server. If this certificate proves to be valid, the sender’s 
subordinate certificate server will send a validation request to the recipient’s subordinate 
certificate server. If this certificate is also validated, the sender’s certificate server will notify 
the sender, and the process of sending a message can proceed. Appendix C below contains 
figures for each step of process. 
Several different scenarios may arise here. First, and most likely, the certificate 
should be valid,  in which case the sender’s certificate server will tell the client the certificate 
can be used, and the sender will proceed. Another possibility is that one of the certificates 
will have been revoked. In this case, the sender’s client will be notified, and it may request 
that the certificate server check for a new certificate. Finally, it is possible that one of the 
issuing certificate servers will be unavailable. In this case, there would be no way to ensure 
the validity of the certificate, and the sender would be unable to proceed. A similar process 
would take place by the recipient of a message, whereby the recipient would ensure that a 
message that has been received was sent using a valid certificate. 
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Although this process is rather complex, it was chosen for this system because it 
provides the highest level of security. Since a certificate would be validated definitively each 
time a message is sent or received, there would be virtually no ambiguity as to whether a 
certificate is still valid or had been revoked. Once this system is fully implemented, the 
performance of this verification system can be tested in order to ensure this method does not 
slow the system down too much. If this method does prove to be too resource intensive, a 
less secure alternative such as using CRLs, or allowing clients and servers to cache 
certificates for a certain amount of time may be required.  
6.1.5 Certificate Server Setup 
Certificate server setup is different for root and subordinate certificate servers. Both 
require a key pair to be created in order to sign certificates, encrypt data, and create digital 
signatures; on a root certificate, the server creates a self-signed certificate. This simply means 
the server creates a certificate for itself, listing itself as the issuer and using its own private 
key to sign the certificate. As the name implies, root servers with self-signed certificate serve 
as a root for the transitive chain of trust used in certificate applications. Users must implicitly 
trust these root certificates in order for the system to work. These certificates would most 
likely be distributed with the mail server, mail client, and subordinate certificate server 
packages so this trust would be automatic. Although this method does potentially raise 
security concerns, it is a requirement of the X.509 certificate model, and is generally able to 
provide good security.  
The subordinate certificate servers must create their key pairs and then request that a 
root certificate server sign their public key. This is done using the process described in 
  
52 
Section 6.1.1, and requires that the root certificate server be able to trust that the owner of the 
subordinate certificate server verifies the identity of any new users that are added to the 
system. Of course, if a subordinate certificate server is found to be violating this requirement, 
the root certificate server can revoke the certificate which effectively invalidates and 
certificates that the subordinate certificate server has issued. Clearly, this would be a drastic 
step that would only need to be taken if a certificate server was found not to be fulfilling its 
duties.  
Certificate servers in this system would not likely be as common as SMTP servers or 
POP3 servers are in the current e-mail system. This is because there would need to be 
stringent requirements in order to verify that the certificate server would only issue new 
certificates when the identity of a new user or mail server has been adequately verified. 
6.2  Mail Server 
The mail server will have several tasks that will need to be performed. These include 
accepting messages from clients and other mail servers, forwarding these messages to the 
recipient’s mail server, and delivering messages to clients. Each of these procedures will be 
discussed here, along with how a mail server is initially setup. 
6.2.1  Accepting Outgoing Mail Messages 
The first function that the mail server must perform is accepting messages from mail 
clients. This is the same as the role of an SMTP server in the current e-mail system. After the 
sender’s mail client has obtained or validated the recipient’s certificate, the client will contact 
the sender’s mail server and deliver the message to this server. A mail server will expect 
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several pieces of information. First, the id number of the message is sent to the server, 
followed by a list of recipient mail addresses, mail servers for delivery, and the symmetric 
key that can be used to decrypt the message content. A separate copy of the symmetric key 
must be sent for each recipient since the symmetric key itself will be encrypted with the 
recipients’ public keys. This is discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.1. 
After the recipient list and encrypted symmetric keys have been transferred, the actual 
message data along with the digital signature is received by the mail server. Since this data is 
encrypted before it is sent to the mail server, and the server cannot access the contents of the 
message. Once all of this data is received, the mail server adds a tag that includes a 
timestamp the server’s alias, and a record of the action that was taken by the mail server 
(received from the sender, forwarded to another mail server, received from another mail 
server, delivered to a recipient). This simply indicates that the message has traveled through 
this server and can be used by the recipient to reconstruct the path of the message if 
necessary.  
The next step for the message is to be transferred to the recipients’ mail servers. This 
step will be discussed in the next section. 
6.2.2  Transferring Messages Between Mail Server 
After the sender transfers a message to its mail server, the message must be 
transferred to the recipients’ mail server(s). This would generally be done immediately after 
receipt of the message, and uses the same format as was described in Section 6.2.1. Again, 
the first step is to transfer the message id, key and alias information for the message 
recipients. For this step, the sender’s mail server would only transfer symmetric keys and 
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aliases for the recipients for which the mail server in question is responsible. So, if a user 
sends the same message to three individuals, two of whom use the same mail server and one 
that uses a different server, the two aliases and keys would be sent to the first mail server and 
the other alias and key set would be sent to the last user’s mail server. This is because a mail 
server only needs to know about a particular recipient if it is responsible for delivering the 
message him or her. Once this transfer is complete, the receiving server will append the 
timestamp, alias and action data for message path reconstruction, the message will be stored 
in the mail server’s database. 
6.2.3  Delivering Messages To A Mail Clients 
The final step is delivering a message to the client. For simplicity sake, this system 
will use a method similar to POP3 where a mail client must periodically check for new 
messages by contacting its mail server and requesting them. When this connection is made, 
the client will request a list of messages stored on the server. The client may either request a 
list of all messages, only new messages that have not been transferred to the user’s mail 
client yet, or only old messages that have already been transferred to the mail client. The mail 
server will respond with a list of message ids indicating whether they are new or old. At this 
point the mail client could request an individual message or a group of messages to be 
retrieved. Alternatively, the mail client may simply request all new messages be retrieved. 
Once the mail server knows which message or messages to transfer, the mail server 
will send them to the client using the same method described in Section 6.2.1. After the 
messages have been received, the client will acknowledge the receipt of the message, and it 
will append an entry to the path indicating that the message has been delivered to that 
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particular client. When the client acknowledges receipt of the message, it has the option to 
request that the server deletes the message. If this client is the only or last recipient of the 
message on this mail server, the message can be deleted. Otherwise, the client will be 
removed from the recipient list for the message and the message will be saved for the other 
clients that have saved or not received the message. 
6.2.4 Mail Server Setup 
Setting up a mail server would require steps similar to that of a certificate server. First 
the server must generate a key pair that would be used to encrypt data and create digital 
signatures. After this key pair is created, a request to have the mail server’s public key signed 
would be sent to a subordinate certificate server. Generally, there is a lower need for a mail 
server’s owner to be stringently verified as opposed to certificate servers or mail users. This 
is because a mail server cannot create new certificates that verify the identity of users or 
servers, and they cannot ever see the contents of any mail messages. Even though the need 
for authentication of the mail server’s owner is lower, some verification should still be done, 
and the steps outlined in Section 6.1.1 would be followed. Once a certificate server has 
signed the mail server’s certificate, the server is ready to accept and delivery mail messages. 
6.3  Mail Client 
The mail client application will serve as the interface to users when sending or 
receiving messages. This section will discuss the functionality of the mail client, including 
sending and receiving messages and initial mail client setup. 
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6.3.1  Sending messages 
Just like in current e-mail clients, the secure mail client will allow users to enter a list 
of recipients, a subject, a message, and attachments. Once this is provided and the user elects 
to send the message, the mail client will contact the user’s certificate server in order to 
request or verify the certificates of the recipients. If none of the required certificates can be 
obtained or verified, the user is alerted and the message cannot be sent. If several of the 
required certificates cannot be obtained or verified, but some can be, the user will be alerted 
of this problem and prompted to either send the message to the recipients whose certificates 
can be obtained and validated or wait and try again later.  
Once the certificates are obtained, the message must be prepared. First the client will 
add the sender’s certificate to the message data so the recipients automatically receive a copy 
of the certificate. Next, the client must digitally sign the message data using the sender’s 
private key. Then the client generates a symmetric key and encrypts the message and 
signature using this key. Finally the client must encrypt the symmetric key using each of the 
recipient’s public keys so they can each access the symmetric key needed to decrypt the 
message. The client will also generate and assign an id number to the message. 
At this point, all of this information must be sent to the mail server. This could be 
done immediately, or the message could be queued until the user requests the client to 
contact the mail server. When the sender’s mail server is contacted, the client will simply 
request to send the message, and the information will be delivered to the server. Steps 1 
through 6 in Appendix D (shown in Figure 34 through Figure 39) show the process of 
preparing and sending a message.  
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6.3.2  Receiving messages 
In order to receive messages that have been sent a user, the user’s client application 
must initiate a connection to his or her mail server. This can either be done at the request of 
the user or could be setup to happen at a certain time interval, every 10 minutes for example. 
Once this connection is made, the client can request that all new messages be sent from the 
server. The server will deliver the messages, and, if they are received by the client correctly, 
they will be acknowledged. Depending on the setup of the client application, it may request 
that the server delete the message. This will be handled by the server as discussed in Section 
6.2.3.  
At this point the client application will need to decrypt the message’s symmetric key 
using the user’s private key. The symmetric key can then be used to decrypt the message. At 
this point, the client has access to the sender’s identity and certificate, so the certificate will 
be validated. Next, the message data will be hashed, the digital signature will be decrypted 
with the sender’s public key, and these two values will be compared to ensure no tampering 
has taken place. At this point, if the message is decrypted successfully, the certificate is valid, 
and the digital signature verifies the integrity of message, the mail client can display the 
message to the user. Steps 7 through 11 in Appendix D (shown in Figure 40 through Figure 
44) show how a message is later retrieved, and the sender verified. 
 
6.3.3  Mail Client Setup 
 As previously mentioned, when a user goes to setup a new mail account they must be 
able to verify their identity. Although it could be possible for someone offering a secure 
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messaging server to verify the identity at the time the user wants to setup the mail client, this 
document will assume the user has already verified their identity before they go to setup their 
mail client.  
 When a user wants to setup a secure mail account, the client will need to generate a 
key pair. Once this key pair is created, the user will need to create a password. This password 
will be used to secure the keystore where the private key and certificates will be stored. It 
will be necessary that the user remember this password and enter it each time the client is 
started. Loss of this password would mean a new key pair and certificate would need to be 
generated. 
The user will then be prompted for the mail address that they have been assigned 
(their alias) and the id number they were given when they authenticated to the secure mail 
provider. This information will be concatenated, hashed, and sent to the certificate server. 
The certificate server will lookup the information, and, if the request is valid and the user’s 
identity has been verified, the server will create and store a certificate for this user and then 
send it back to the client. At this point the client can use the key pair and certificate to send 
and receive mail message. Figures of the process of having a certificate created are shown in 
Appendix A. 
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 CHAPTER 7.  CONCLUSION 
By implementing this protocol for secure message transfer, many of the problems 
with current e-mail technologies could be solved. Spam would decrease because it would be 
much harder to constantly create new message addresses since each address must be tied to 
an actual identity. Phishing would be much more difficult since spoofing would no longer be 
a trivial task. In addition, it would be much easier for users to see when an e-mail comes 
from a business, financial institution, or government. This would give users an additional 
assurance that any messages from these entities are legitimate. Finally, confidentiality would 
be protected on several levels by using encryption to secure the message data and headers.  
The next step for this system would be implementing the software required in order to 
test the system in an actual environment. Some modifications may need to be made in order 
to prevent the protocol from being too resource intensive. Security is a trade off after all, and 
although this protocol should be very secure, it may require too much network bandwidth to 
be feasible.  
Although great strides have been made to secure existing e-mail technologies, these 
advances have not reached a broad market and have done little to help the average e-mail 
user. This protocol offers hope that it is possible to have a secure message system in place 
that is also easy to setup and use.  
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APPENDIX A.  CREATING A NEW USER CERTIFICATE 
This section contains diagrams showing the step-by-step process of creating a new 
certificate for a new secure mail user. 
 
Figure 18.  Step 1 of Creating a New Certificate 
 
 
Figure 19.  Step 2 of Creating a New Certificate 
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Figure 20.  Step 3 of Creating a New Certificate 
 
 
Figure 21.  Step 4 of Creating a New Certificate 
 
 
Figure 22.  Step 5 of Creating a New Certificate 
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Figure 23.  Step 6 of Creating a New Certificate 
 
Figure 24.  Step 7 of Creating a New Certificate 
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APPENDIX B.  RETRIEVING A CERTIFICATE 
This section will describe the process used to retrieve a certificate. This will mainly 
be performed when a user wants to send a message to a user with whom he has never 
communicated before. After the first communication between two parties takes place, a user 
will use the procedure shown is Appendix C for any subsequent communications. 
 
Figure 25.  Step 1 of Retrieving a Certificate 
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Figure 26.  Step 2 of Retrieving a Certificate 
 
Figure 27.  Step 3 of Retrieving a Certificate 
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Figure 28.  Step 4 of Retrieving a Certificate 
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APPENDIX C.  VERIFYING A CERTIFICATE 
This section will describe the process used to verify a certificate. This procedure will 
be performed in several instances, such as when a user receives a message and when a user 
sends a message to a recipient whose certificate he already has. 
 
Figure 29.  Step 1 of Verifying a Certificate 
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Figure 30.  Step 2 of Verifying a Certificate 
 
Figure 31.  Step 3 of Verifying a Certificate 
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Figure 32.  Step 4 of Verifying a Certificate 
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APPENDIX D.  SENDING/RECEIVING A MAIL MESSAGE 
This section contains diagrams showing the step-by-step communications processes 
required to send and receive a mail message. Steps 1 through 6 (shown in Figure 34 through 
Figure 39) show the process of preparing and sending a message. Steps 7 through 11 (shown 
in Figure 40 through Figure 44) show how a message is later retrieved, and the sender 
verified. 
 
Figure 33.  Message Travel Flowchart 
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Figure 34.  Step 1 of Sending a Message 
 
Figure 35.  Step 2 of Sending a Message 
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Figure 36.  Step 3 of Sending a Message 
 
Figure 37.  Step 4 of Sending a Message 
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Figure 38.  Step 5 of Sending a Message 
 
Figure 39.  Step 6 of Sending a Message 
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Figure 40.  Step 7 of Sending a Message 
 
Figure 41.  Step 8 of Sending a Message 
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Figure 42.  Step 9 of Sending a Message 
 
Figure 43.  Step 10 of Sending a Message 
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Figure 44.  Step 11 of Sending a Message 
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APPENDIX E.  SAMPLE CERTIFICATE 
[0]         Version: 3 
         SerialNumber: 11745822471258171591308404038595 
            IssuerDN: CN=Test Certificate 
            Start Date: Thu Mar 22 11:50:47 CDT 2007 
           Final Date: Tue Mar 06 19:08:57 CST 2007 
            SubjectDN: type=USER,name=john.meeker@certServ.americabank.com 
           Public Key: RSA Public Key 
            modulus: 
b15947d7963c2e137cad3fb0f895b500af017e5ac59110aa29ae6c80990bcc808a5ff96b5a
1f1761e4703af4756c2278cf1885ab798f0338be8643612b8e67e3b0acda10c5ae20a3053f
4854fdc005ad4b4bfd5d0fe2854f2c3baf1b8ede3e14286981b52f019fceaba9e834e67415
785caa9c73b0cba457996f1b7f48906f11 
     public exponent: 10001 
Signature Algorithm: SHA1WithRSAEncryption 
            Signature: 201dcaa8b304a4a70d2e1274105b4a2260d7b82e 
                       593cb92d74623cbb0a6f5d3c8f58c6c08f41c457 
                       addf07cb170480cc0c6b66b76c6b61badb583420 
                       011b703d2114d26b7e258c8ed8184f46b14ccd56 
                       7afd1eb594881fe475706accdba24fb8aea3a1c5 
                       94d713a626f5185cd1e7f109f0fc985d98b8f41d 
                       61432f5182d607a2 
      Extensions:  
                       critical(false) 2.5.29.35 value = DER Sequence 
    Tagged [0] IMPLICIT  
        DER Octet String[20]  
    Tagged [1] 
        Tagged [4] 
            DER Sequence 
                DER Set 
                    DER Sequence 
                        ObjectIdentifier(2.5.4.3) 
                        PrintableString(Test Certificate)  
    Tagged [2] IMPLICIT  
        DER Octet String[6]  
 
                       critical(false) 2.5.29.14 value = DER Octet 
String[20]  
                       critical(true) BasicConstraints: isCa(true), 
pathLenConstraint = 1 
                       critical(true) KeyUsage: 0xb6 
                       critical(false) 2.5.29.17 value = DER Sequence 
    Tagged [0] IMPLICIT  
        DER Sequence 
            Integer(1) 
  UTF8String(John Meeker) 
            UTF8String(john.meeker@certServ.americabank.com)  
            UTF8String(FINANCIAL)  
            UTF8String(mail.americabank.com)  
            UTF8String(America's Bank)  
            UTF8String(Loan Officer) 
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APPENDIX F.  CERTIFICATE EXTENSION DEFINITION 
Extension ::= SEQUENCE { 
 Version  INTEGER, 
 Name  UTF8String, 
 Alias  UTF8String, 
 Type   ENUMERATED { 
     BUSINESS, 
     EBUSINESS, 
     FINANCIAL, 
     GOVERNMENT, 
     PERSONAL, 
     MAILSERVER, 
     ROOTCERTIFICATESERVER 
     SUBORDINATECERTIFICATESERVER }, 
 MailServer UTF8String OPTIONAL, 
   -- if present must not be one of the server types 
 Affiliation UTF8String OPTIONAL, 
   -- if present MailServer must also be present 
 Title  UTF8String OPTIONAL, 
-- if present Affiliation must also be present 
 SigningAuth INTEGER OPTIONAL 
-- if present must be one of the certificate  
-- server types 
  
  
 
} 
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APPENDIX G.  XML COMMAND SPECIFICATION 
This section will give details on the commands that will be used between the 
communicating entities in this protocol (mail client, mail server, and certificate server) in the 
form of XML schema files. There are also several sample XML commands shown at the end 
of this section. It is important to remember that although the sample XML commands appear 
unencrypted, all of this data would be sent over a TLS encrypted connection. In addition, 
some sections (such as the MessageData section inside of the Message section) would 
themselves be encrypted; however, this schema files show what the decrypted data contained 
in these sections should look like. Sections G.1 through G.17 show actual complete 
commands that will be used over the network, while Sections G.18 through G.29 show pieces 
of commands that are separated out for clarity or reuse. G.30 will show a sample 
communication flow between a mail server and mail client when picking up messages. Here, 
some data has been replaced with a placeholder for clarity. 
G.1  SigningRequestAuthentication.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'> 
 <xsd:element name="SigningRequestAuthentication" type="xsd:base64Binary"> 
 </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.2  SigningResponseAuthentication.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Alias.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="SigningResponseAuthentication"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="Alias"/> 
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                <xsd:element name="Name" type="xsd:string"/> 
                <xsd:element name="Type"> 
                    <xsd:simpleType> 
                        <xsd:restriction base="xsd:string"> 
                            <xsd:enumeration value="PERSONAL"/> 
                            <xsd:enumeration value="BUSINESS"/> 
                            <xsd:enumeration value="EBUSINESS"/> 
                            <xsd:enumeration value="FINANCIAL"/> 
                            <xsd:enumeration value="GOVERNMENT"/> 
                        </xsd:restriction> 
                    </xsd:simpleType> 
                </xsd:element> 
                <xsd:element name="Provider" type="xsd:string"/> 
                <xsd:element name="Title" type="xsd:string"/> 
                <xsd:element name="Affiliation" type="xsd:string"/> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.3  SigningRequest.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'> 
 <xsd:element name="SigningRequest" type="xsd:base64Binary"> 
 </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema> 
G.4  SigningResponse.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Certificate.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="SigningResponse"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="Certificate"/> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
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G.5  CertificateRequest.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Alias.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="CertificateRequest"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="Alias" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.6  CertificateResponses.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Certificate.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Alias.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="CertificateResponses"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element name="CertificateResponse" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="Alias"/> 
                            <xsd:element ref="Certificate" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.7  CertificateVerificationRequest.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Alias.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="CertificateVerificationRequests"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element name="CertificateVerificationRequest" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
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                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="Alias"/> 
                            <xsd:element name="CertificateHash" type="xsd:base64Binary"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.8  CertificateVerificationResponses.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Alias.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="CertificateStatus.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Reason.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="CertificateVerificationResponses"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element name="CertificateVerificationResponse" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="Alias"/> 
                            <xsd:element ref="CertificateStatus"/> 
                            <xsd:element ref="Reason"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.9  SendMessages.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Message.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="SendMessages"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="Message" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
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    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.10  MessageReceived.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="MessageID.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Status.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="MessagesReceived"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element name="MessageReceived" minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="MessageID"/> 
                            <xsd:element ref="Status" minOccurs="0"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.11  RetrieveMessages.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="MessageID.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="RetrieveMessages" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="MessageID" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.12  DeleteMessages.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="MessageID.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="DeleteMessages" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
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        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="MessageID" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.13  DeletedMessages.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="MessageID.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Status.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="DeletedMessages" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element name="DeletedMessage" minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="MessageID" maxOccurs="1"/> 
                            <xsd:element ref="Status" minOccurs="0"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.14  RetrieveMessageList.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:element name="RetrieveMessageList"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:attribute name="type" use="required"> 
                <xsd:simpleType> 
                    <xsd:restriction base="xsd:string"> 
                        <xsd:enumeration value="OLD"/> 
                        <xsd:enumeration value="NEW"/> 
                        <xsd:enumeration value="ALL"/> 
                    </xsd:restriction> 
                </xsd:simpleType> 
            </xsd:attribute> 
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        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.15  MessageList.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="MessageID.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="MessageList"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element name="NewMessages" minOccurs="0"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="MessageID" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
                <xsd:element name="OldMessages" minOccurs="0"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="MessageID" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.16  EndCommunication.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Status.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="EndCommunication"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="Status"/> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
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G.17  Ready.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:element name="Ready"/> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.18  Alias.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:element name="Alias"> 
        <xsd:simpleType> 
            <xsd:restriction base="xsd:string"> 
                <xsd:pattern value="([\.a-zA-Z0-9_-])+@([a-zA-Z0-9_-])+(([a-zA-Z0-9_-])*\.([a-
zA-Z0-9_-])+)+"/> 
            </xsd:restriction> 
        </xsd:simpleType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.19  Certificate.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'> 
 <xsd:element name="Certificate" type="xsd:base64Binary"> 
 </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema> 
G.20  CertificateStatus.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:element name="CertificateStatus"> 
        <xsd:simpleType> 
            <xsd:restriction base="xsd:string"> 
                <xsd:enumeration value="VALID"/> 
                <xsd:enumeration value="REVOKED"/> 
                <xsd:enumeration value="UNKNOWN"/> 
            </xsd:restriction> 
        </xsd:simpleType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
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G.21  Code.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:element name="Code"> 
        <xsd:simpleType> 
            <xsd:restriction base="xsd:string"> 
                <xsd:enumeration value="SUCCESS"/> 
                <xsd:enumeration value="FAILURE"/> 
            </xsd:restriction> 
        </xsd:simpleType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.22  MailServer.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="TimeStamp.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Alias.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="MailServer"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="Alias"/> 
                <xsd:element name="Action" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="TimeStamp"/> 
                            <xsd:element name="OldID" type="xsd:long" minOccurs="0"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                        <xsd:attribute name="type" use="required"> 
                            <xsd:simpleType> 
                                <xsd:restriction base="xsd:string"> 
                                    <xsd:enumeration value="RECEIVED"/> 
                                    <xsd:enumeration value="FORWARDED"/> 
                                    <xsd:enumeration value="DELIVERED"/> 
                                    <xsd:enumeration value="CHANGEDID"/> 
                                </xsd:restriction> 
                            </xsd:simpleType> 
                        </xsd:attribute> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
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G.23  Message.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="MessageID.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="MessageData.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="MailServer.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Recipient.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="SymmetricKey.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="Message"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element name="Recipients"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="Recipient" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
                <xsd:element name="SymmetricKey" type="xsd:base64Binary"/> 
                <xsd:element ref="MessageData"/> 
                <xsd:element name="DigitalSignature" type="xsd:base64Binary"/> 
                <xsd:element name="Path"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="MailServer" maxOccurs="unbounded" 
minOccurs="0"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.24  MessageData.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Certificate.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="TimeStamp.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Recipient.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="MessageData"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="TimeStamp"/> 
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                <xsd:element name="Subject" type="xsd:string"/> 
                <xsd:element name="MessageText" type="xsd:string"/> 
                <xsd:element ref="Certificate"/> 
                <xsd:element name="RecipientList" minOccurs="0"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element ref="Recipient" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
                <xsd:element name="AttachmentList" minOccurs="0"> 
                    <xsd:complexType> 
                        <xsd:sequence> 
                            <xsd:element name="Attachment" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
                                <xsd:complexType> 
                                    <xsd:sequence> 
                                        <xsd:element name="Data" type="xsd:base64Binary"/> 
                                    </xsd:sequence> 
                                    <xsd:attribute name="filename" use="required" type="xsd:string"/> 
                                </xsd:complexType>                           
                            </xsd:element> 
                        </xsd:sequence> 
                    </xsd:complexType> 
                </xsd:element> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.25  MessageID.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:element name="MessageID" type="xsd:long"/> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.26  Recipient.xsd 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="SymmetricKey.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Alias.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="Recipient"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
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            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="Alias"/> 
                <xsd:element ref="Alias"/> 
                <xsd:element ref="SymmetricKey" minOccurs="0"/> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.27  Status.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Reason.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:include schemaLocation="Code.xsd"/> 
    <xsd:element name="Status"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
            <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref="Code"/> 
                <xsd:element ref="Reason" minOccurs="0"/> 
            </xsd:sequence> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
    </xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema>  
 
G.28  SymmetricKey.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:element name="SymmetricKey" type="xsd:base64Binary"/> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.29  TimeStamp.xsd 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <xsd:element name="TimeStamp" type="xsd:long"/> 
</xsd:schema>  
G.30 Sample Commands to Retrieve Messages 
Mail Client to Mail Server 
<RetrieveMessageList type="NEW" />  
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Mail Server to Mail Client 
<MessageList> 
    <!--Element NewMessages is optional--> 
    <NewMessages> 
        <MessageID>5</MessageID> 
        <MessageID>6</MessageID> 
        <MessageID>7</MessageID> 
    </NewMessages> 
</MessageList> 
 
Mail Client to Mail Server 
<RetrieveMessages> 
    <MessageID>5</MessageID> 
</RetrieveMessages> 
 
Mail Server to Mail Client 
<SendMessages> 
    <Message>       
        <SymmetricKey> BASE64BINARY</SymmetricKey> 
        <MessageData> 
            <TimeStamp> 1167613871</TimeStamp> 
            <Subject>Update your account information</Subject> 
            <MessageText>Please update your account information at your earliest 
convenience.</MessageText> 
            <Certificate>BASE64BINARY</Certificate> 
        </MessageData> 
        <DigitalSignature>BASE64BINARY</DigitalSignature> 
</SendMessages> 
 
Mail Client to Mail Server 
<MessagesReceived> 
    <MessageReceived> 
        <MessageID>5</MessageID> 
        <Status> 
            <Code>SUCCESS</Code> 
        </Status> 
    </MessageReceived> 
</MessagesReceived> 
 
Mail Server to Mail Client 
<Ready/> 
 
Mail Client to Mail Server 
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<EndCommunication> 
    <Status> 
        <Code>SUCCESS</Code> 
    </Status> 
</EndCommunication> 
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APPENDIX H.  NETWORK COMMUNICATION 
FLOWCHARTS  
This section provides flow charts for the communication that takes place between two 
entities in this system. Each step of the flow chart will be labeled with the sending and 
receiving entity, as well as the XML scheme file that the command being sent is based off of. 
If at any time an entity receives a command that it is not expecting, it will send an end 
communication command and terminate the connection. Also notice that the send message 
flow is reused for mail server to mail server connections, mail client sending mail, and mail 
clients receiving mail. 
 
Figure 45.  Certificate Signing Request Flowchart 
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Figure 46.  Certificate Retrieval Flowchart 
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Figure 47.  Certificate Verification Flowchart 
 
 
Figure 48.  Send Message Flowchart 
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Figure 49.  Mail Client to Mail Server Connection Flowchart 
 
 
 
  
96 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[1] Lemos, R. (2006, May 17). Blue Security folds under spammer's wrath. Retrieved June 21, 2006, from 
SecurityFocus Web site: http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11392 
 
[2] Wells, T. O. (2000, July 15). Delivering documents through e-mail -- Is it sate and ethical?. Retrieved 
August 2, 2006, from HighBeam Web site: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-63972846.html 
 
[3] Kerner, S. M. (2004, May 6). The cost of phishing hits $1.2 billion. Retrieved June 21, 2006, from 
internetnews.com Web site: http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/3350891 
 
[4] Gaudin, S. (2007, February 22). 90% Of E-Mail Will Be Spam By Year's End. Retrieved March 3, 2007, 
from InformationWeek Web site: http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID= 
197008209 
 
[5] Stone, B. (2006, December 12). Spam Doubles, Finding New Ways to Deliver Itself. Retrieved January, 18 
2007, from New York Times Web site: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/06/technology/06spam.html? 
pagewanted =1&ei=5088partner=rssnyt&en=d2c6bcfd3354cbaf&ex=1323061200&emc=rss 
 
[6] Martin, K. (2006, May 30). Abandon e-mail!. Retrieved July 17, 2006, from SecurityFocus Web site: 
http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/404/1 
 
[7] Abdul-Rahman, A. (1997).The pgp trust model. The Journal of Electronic Commerce. 
 
[8] Network Working Group (1998, March). The Internet Engineering Task Force. Retrieved August 10, 2006, 
from S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification Web site: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2311.txt  
 
[9] Network Working Group (1998, March). The Internet Engineering Task Force. Retrieved August 11, 2006, 
from S/MIME Version 2 Certificate Handling Web site: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2312.txt 
 
[10] Udell, J. (2004, March 23). How to forge an S/MIME signature. Retrieved October 12, 2006, from 
InfoWorld Web site: http://weblog.infoworld.com/udell/2004/03/23.html#a952 
 
[11] (2006). DomainKeys: Proving and protecting email sender identity. Retrieved March 22, 2007, from 
Yahoo! Anti-Spam Resource Center Web site: http://antispam.yahoo.com/domainkeys#a11 
 
[12] Bernstein, D. J. Notes on the domain name system. Retrieved March 10, 2007, from djbdns Web site: 
http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/notes.html 
 
[13] (2005, February 17). Sender ID framework overview. Retrieved July 18, 2006, from Microsoft Safety Web 
site: http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/safety/technologies/senderid/overview.mspx 
 
[14] (2006, August 7). Escalating attacks on public instant messaging. Retrieved March 3, 2007, from postini 
Web site: http://www.postini.com/news_events/pr/pr080706.php  
 
[15] Chase, A. O. (2007, January 24). Experts say email will be default communication for confidential data by 
2009. Retrieved March 5, 2007, from BizReport Web site: http://www.bizreport.com/2007/01/experts_say_e-
mail_will_be_default_communication_for_confidential_data_by_2009.html 
 
[16] Network Working Group (2006, April) The transport layer security (TLS) protocol. Retrieved March 22, 
2007, from The Internet Engineering Task Force Web site: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346 
 
[17] Network Working Group (1982, August 13). Simple mail transfer protocol. Retrieved September 24, 2006, 
  
97 
Web site: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0821.txt 
 
[18] Network Working Group (1982, November). SMTP service extensions. Retrieved September 24, 2006, 
from The Internet Engineering Task Force Web site: http://ietf.org /rfc/rfc1869.html 
 
[19] Network Working Group (1996, May). Post office protocol. Retrieved September 24, 2006, from The 
Internet Engineering Task Force Web site: http://www.ietf.org/rfcs/rfc1939.html 
 
[20] Network Working Group (2003, March). Internet message access protocol. Retrieved September 24, 2006, 
from The Internet Engineering Task Force Web site: http://www.ietf.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3501.html 
 
[21] W3 Consortium (2006, August 16). Extensible markup language (XML) 1.1. Retrieved November 2, 2006, 
from W3C Web site: http://www.w3.org/TR/xml11/ 
 
[22] Network Working Group (2002, April). Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL) Profile. Retrieved November 12, 2006, from The Internet Engineering Task Force Web 
site: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280.txt 
 
[23] Network Working Group (2000, November). PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification. 
Retrieved November 19, 2006, from Internet Engineering Task Force Web site: 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt 
 
[24] Network Working Group (1999, June). X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status 
Protocol - OCSP. Retrieved January 23, 2007, from Internet Engineering Task Force Web site: 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2560.txt 
